A novel vehicle-based GNSS integrity augmentation system for autonomous airport surface operations by Bijjahalli, S et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for downloading this document from the RMIT Research 
Repository. 
 
 
The RMIT Research Repository is an open access database showcasing the 
research outputs of RMIT University researchers. 
 
RMIT Research Repository: http://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/ 
 
 
Citation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See this record in the RMIT Research Repository at:  
 
 
 
Version:  
 
 
 
Copyright Statement:  
© 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Link to Published Version: 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE THIS PAGE 
 1 
 
This is the author pre-publication version. This paper does not include the changes arising from the revision, formatting and 
publishing processes. The final version that should be used for referencing is: 
S. Bijjahalli, S. Ramasamy and R. Sabatini, “A Novel Vehicle-Based GNSS Integrity Augmentation System for Autonomous 
Airport Surface Operations”, Journal of Intelligent & Robotic Systems, pp. 1-25, 2017. DOI: 10.1007/s10846-017-0479-8 
 
A NOVEL VEHICLE-BASED GNSS INTEGRITY 
AUGMENTATION SYSTEM FOR AUTONOMOUS AIRPORT 
SURFACE OPERATIONS 
 
 
Suraj Bijjahalli· Subramanian Ramasamy· Roberto Sabatini* 
 
School of Engineering – Aerospace Engineering and Aviation Discipline                                                            
Melbourne, VIC 3000, Australia 
 
*roberto.sabatini@rmit.edu.au 
 
 
Abstract 
Autonomous vehicles equipped with integrity 
augmentation systems offer the potential to increase 
safety, efficiency and sustainability of airport ground 
operations. The model predictive behavior of these 
systems supports a timely detection of any deviations 
from the Required Navigation Performance (RNP), 
producing useful alerts for onboard mission 
management. Firstly, the system architecture of a 
Navigation and Guidance System (NGS) for 
autonomous airport surface vehicle operations based 
on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) 
measurements is described. Subsequently, an integrity 
augmentation module is implemented in the NGS by 
modeling the key GNSS signal degradation 
phenomena including masking, multipath and signal 
attenuation. The GNSS integrity augmentation system 
is capable of monitoring the RNP and alerting the 
remote operator of the airport surface vehicle. The 
uniqueness of the presented system is that both 
caution and warning flags are produced based on 
prediction-avoidance and reaction-correction 
capabilities respectively.  Additionally, the system is 
capable of issuing suitable steering commands to the 
onboard mission management system/remote ground 
base station operator in the event of GNSS signal 
degradations or losses. Multipath is modelled in detail 
using a ray tracing algorithm and the vehicle position 
error is computed as a function of relative geometry 
between the satellites, receiver antenna and reflectors 
in realistic airport operation scenarios. Additionally, 
the surface vehicle dynamics and reflective surfaces 
of buildings are modelled in order to simulate a 
vehicle trajectory through a typical airport 
airside/aprons environment. Simulation case studies 
are performed to validate the mathematical models 
developed for the integrity augmentation system and 
the results corroborate the suitability of the proposed 
system to generate useful and timely integrity flags 
when GNSS is used as the primary means of 
navigation. 
 
Keywords: 
Global Navigation Satellite System · Avionics Based 
Augmentation System · Navigation and Guidance 
System · Airport Ground Operations · Autonomous 
Systems · Model Predictive Systems 
1. Introduction  
A steady growth in global and regional air traffic 
drives the demand for exploring new means of 
making airport operations safer, more efficient and 
more environmentally sustainable. A survey 
performed by the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) 
estimates that 27,000 accidents cause 243,000 injuries 
globally every year. The accident and injury rates per 
1000 departures calculated from this estimate are 1 
and 9 respectively [1]. A lack of industry wide 
standards for ramp operations, coupled with the fact 
that safety on the ramp is handled primarily by 
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airlines, makes adherence to regulations inconsistent. 
Emerging solutions for aircraft tug operations 
including Taxibot
TM
 and SAFETug
TM
 employ a 
tractor push for operating an aircraft in the airside of 
airports. Both manned and autonomous tugs are 
currently in use, with the autonomous tugs gaining 
significance owing to its features that support reduced   
human intervention. Robotic systems that perform 
ground operations autonomously or with minimal 
human intervention can facilitate uniform ramp 
policies and ensure adherence by eliminating factors 
such as human error, fatigue and boredom. Robotic 
vehicles have been previously implemented on a 
small scale at Heathrow airport as  part of a Personal 
Rapid Transit (PRT) system [2].  
Autonomous perception and control minimizes the 
need for an external infrastructure including guidance 
rails. The integration of autonomous vehicles with 
airside operations, however has not been extensively 
researched so far. Safety regulations enforced for 
airside  operations constrain vehicle movement to 
precisely defined pathways making it necessary for 
robotic vehicles to demonstrate trusted autonomy 
(i.e., the vehicle must be able to determine whether 
data obtained from the on-board sensors is reliable or 
is  corrupted by external error sources).  A Navigation 
and Guidance System (NGS) using Carrier-Phase 
Differential Global Navigation Satellite System 
(CPD-GNSS) for localizing autonomous airport 
surface vehicles is presented. CPD-GNSS systems 
have previously been employed for localizing robotic 
systems with a high degree of precision. However, 
CPD-GNSS is generally susceptible to several failure 
modes that increase the Total System Error (TSE), 
leading to the requirement for ‘system integrity’. In 
the context of GNSS receivers, integrity refers to the 
level of confidence that can be placed in the signal 
measurements and subsequent position solution. A 
well designed integrity augmentation system will be 
able to detect faults and alert the user in a timely 
manner to allow avoidance manoeuvres. A 
framework for an autonomous airport ground vehicle 
navigation system proposed in [3] highlights the 
necessity of GNSS integrity augmentation in order to 
meet the requirements of safe airside navigation. 
Integrity augmentation strategies that address GNSS 
signal degradations or losses have been implemented 
in the past, mainly targeting aircraft navigation and 
guidance.  However, these techniques are not directly 
applicable to ground vehicle navigation [4-6]. 
Existing GNSS integrity augmentation methods 
include Ground-Based Augmentation Systems 
(GBAS), Satellite-Based Augmentation Systems 
(SBAS) and Aircraft-Based Augmentation Systems 
(ABAS). GBAS makes use of reference receivers 
located at precisely surveyed locations to compute 
integrity data (‘Use/Do not use’ messages) and 
pseudorange corrections, and disseminate them to 
nearby mobile receivers, typically via a Very High 
Frequency (VHF) link. GBAS leverages the fact that 
several GNSS pseudorange error components 
(satellite clock errors, ephemeris errors, atmospheric 
errors) are spatially correlated. SBAS is also a 
technique that depends on reference and mobile 
receivers sharing the same error in order to provide 
valid integrity alerts and corrections. SBAS exploits 
Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites to expand 
the coverage area of integrity provision and 
pseudorange corrections. Both GBAS and SBAS 
incur a higher cost in terms of infrastructure and 
require a minimum number of visible satellites to 
function effectively. More importantly, these 
techniques cannot provide integrity in the presence of 
local GNSS errors like signal multipath, which 
dominates pseudorange error in complex ground 
environments [7]. ABAS monitors integrity using 
algorithms that process redundant GNSS signal 
measurements and onboard sensors. In several 
aviation applications, ABAS offers greater flexibility 
then GBAS/SBAS as it can be designed to address all 
error components of GNSS signals including local 
phenomena like multipath and antenna masking.  This 
makes ABAS suitable for an extended range of 
integrity augmentation functionalities covering all 
operational flight phases (i.e., ground taxing, takeoff, 
en-route and landing). The system operates via 
separate principles from GNSS, and is therefore not 
subject to the same sources of error and interference. 
An Aircraft-Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) 
system is presented in [8-10], in which the GNSS 
signal degradations affecting manned/unmanned 
aircraft navigation is modelled to provide timely 
integrity alerts to pilots. This research broadens the 
spectrum of the ABIA concept, which is a type of 
ABAS, to ground transportation systems and the 
present paper specifically addresses the 
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implementation of model predictive features in 
airport surface vehicles. Causes of GNSS signal 
degradations in airport environments including 
masking, multipath and carrier-to-noise ratio are 
modelled and estimated. In particular, ray tracing 
methods have been adopted to model signal multipath 
[11,12]. Conventionally, ray tracing methods have 
been implemented for static applications where the 
receiver is assumed to be stationary. Therefore, there 
is an opportunity to explore the validity of this 
approach for assessing multipath in kinematic 
applications. Based on the above discussions, the key 
focus of this research is to design and implement an 
integrity augmentation system for ground vehicle 
GNSS receivers. The system is capable of detecting 
sources of signal degradation and initiating safety 
procedures autonomously. The approach can be 
applied to wheeled or tracked airport ground vehicles 
operating on the airside region that are designed for 
operations such as aircraft towing, catering, de-icing, 
cargo transport, debris detection and removal from 
runways. Integrity augmentation systems have been 
designed and implemented to provide integrity in the 
presence of GNSS faults (signal fading, antenna 
masking, multipath) occurring on aerial platforms.              
In ground vehicle navigation, these faults are 
attributed to sources that differ from those 
encountered in aerial navigation. GNSS faults in 
ground environments are analysed to design an 
integrity augmentation system that fits into a 
Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) 
framework for airport surface operations as illustrated 
in Fig. 1. The NGS on board each airport ground 
vehicle delivers time-stamped position and velocity 
estimates to other ground vehicles, parked aircraft 
and to a central Ground Base System (GBS) via Line-
of-Sight (LOS) wireless VHF datalink and Beyond 
LOS (BLOS) communication links.  The wireless 
GBS comprises several modules that enhance the 
ground operator’s situational awareness such as 
vehicle parameters and trajectory display, tactical 
map, video feed, communication console, etc. Vision-
based sensors on the vehicle can enhance some of 
these functionalities. A vehicle command console 
with a Human-Machine Interface (HMI) is used to 
issue commands to the NGS. A generic four-wheeled 
vehicle dynamics model representative of an airside 
vehicle, such as a cargo truck is selected and 
presented in later sections along with an autonomous 
steering control law to validate the introduced 
mathematical models. 
VEHICLE COMMAND CONSOLE
SURVEILLANCE DATA – POSITION, VELOCITY AND TIME
GBS UPLINK – MISSION PARAMETERS
NAVIGATION AND 
GUIDANCE SYSTEM
VEHICLE PARAMETER DISPLAY
VEHICLE TRAJECTORY DISPLAYVEHICLE VIDEO FEED
SURVEILLANCE - GROUND BASE STATION
GROUND 
VEHICLE 
PARKED 
AIRCRAFT 
COMMUNICATIONS
LOS and BLOS
GNSS/COMM
SATELLITE
GNSS SIGNALS/BLOS COMMUNICATION  INFORMATION
COMMUNICATION CONSOLETACTICAL MAP
 
Fig. 1 CNS framework for autonomous airport surface operations
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2. Navigation and Guidance System  
Most autonomous systems are based on an 
architecture as described in [13,14]. The layers of 
these systems typically include [4,15-17] :  
 A sensory layer including GNSS receivers, 
Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and other 
navigation sensors. 
 A perception layer comprising of a multi-
sensor data fusion algorithm such as an 
Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) or Unscented 
Kalman Filter (UKF) to fuse GNSS and 
other sensory data to obtain an accurate best 
estimate of the vehicle’s Position, Velocity 
and Attitude (PVA) measurements. 
PVA estimation can be improved by augmenting 
GNSS information with differential measurements 
from a number of reference stations in order to 
compensate for atmospheric errors, and by measuring 
the phase of the incoming carrier wave signal. In 
theory, position estimation accurate to a few 
centimetres can be achieved by CPD-GNSS [18]. 
Additionally, CPD-GNSS can be leveraged on a multi 
antenna setup to obtain highly accurate attitude 
estimates, which can then be fused with  INS attitude 
estimates [18,19], a concept that has been well 
researched for attitude determination, mainly in the 
aviation domain [20-23]. An NGS based on CPD-
GNSS is therefore a likely candidate to achieve the 
required positioning and attitude accuracy for 
autonomous ground navigation tasks. However, CPD-
GNSS based navigation is subject to error sources 
that can degrade the performance, and are dependent 
on:  
 Satellite geometry, quantified by Dilution Of 
Precision (DOP); 
 Atmospheric effects (ionospheric advance, 
tropospheric delay, attenuation and scintillation), 
which can either lower accuracy of performance; 
 
 Antenna masking, which can potentially block 
signals; 
 Multipath, which is dependent on the navigation 
environment. 
DOP parameters are well defined as in [18,19,24] and 
the receiver software is usually configured to ignore 
satellites that result in a poor DOP. Several models 
for quantifying atmospheric errors have been 
developed as described in [18,19] to mitigate PVA 
degradations using suitable countermeasures. 
Antenna masking is directly related to the LOS 
between satellites and the receiver antennas, and this, 
in turn, is dependent on the airport environment and 
relative geometry between the antenna and various 
objects in the environment. Multipath, or signal 
reflections prior to arrival at the receiver can severely 
reduce PVA accuracy by inducing errors in the signal 
phase measurements, which are a function of the 
reflecting surface material, and the relative geometry 
between the receiver antenna and the reflector. An 
overall NGS architecture highlighting the various 
error sources, the sensor suite, a data-fusion module, 
an integrity augmentation system and a mission 
management system is illustrated in Fig. 2. The 
modelling of error sources associated with Global 
Positioning System (GPS), which is one of the most 
widely used GNSS constellations, enables us to 
understand their effect on position error, and allows 
for early detection of accuracy degradation, thereby 
boosting system integrity or trustworthiness. 
Corruption of the pseudorange measurements due to 
erroneous measurement of the Pseudo Random Noise 
(PRN) code or carrier-phase can lower the system 
accuracy to hazardous levels. Hence it is necessary to 
define accuracy thresholds or alert limits based on 
analytical modelling of GPS error sources. Since the 
positioning error cannot be deduced directly, the key 
challenge is to infer lowered accuracy for each 
satellite based on carrier-phase measurements, and 
accordingly issue alerts. 
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Fig. 2  System architecture 
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Fig. 3  Carrier/code phase measurement decision logic
The error sources described can potentially cause a 
loss-of-lock with satellite(s), resulting in a 
discontinuity in the receiver’s carrier-phase 
measurement, a phenomenon known as ‘cycle-slip’. 
A cycle-slip makes it necessary for the receiver to re-
initialize of the algorithm used to measure carrier-
phase, a computationally intensive and time-
consuming process. The presence of buildings and 
other objects in the airport environment can increase 
the occurrence of cycle-slips.  The proposed system 
therefore is capable of switching to code-range (C/A) 
measurements when carrier-phase measurements are 
affected by cycle-slips. In Fig. 3, the navigation 
processing module in the receiver uses carrier-phase 
measurements to compute PVA. If carrier-phase 
measurements are interrupted, the algorithm re-
initializes the cycle-count for measuring carrier-
phase, while switching to a code-range measurement 
in parallel. Although code-range yields a lower 
accuracy, this capability to switch between 
measurements makes the system robust to loss-of-
lock with satellites.  
3. GNSS Integrity Augmentation 
In line with the above discussions, integrity is defined 
in [25] as the capability of the system to issue alerts 
when system accuracy degrades below a predefined 
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threshold. GNSS system integrity has been 
extensively studied in literature, the most notable is 
the Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
(RAIM) [19], which computes the Horizontal and 
Vertical Protection Level (HPL/VPL) or the 
minimum position error that can be detected, given 
the measurement noise and satellite geometry. 
Carrier-phase based RAIM (CRAIM) extends the 
concept of RAIM to GNSS receivers that use carrier-
phase measurements to compute vehicular position. 
The primary drawbacks in CRAIM arise due to 
multipath, cycle-slips and ambiguity resolution [26]. 
Several approaches to CRAIM that differ with regard 
to how integer ambiguity is resolved are found in the 
literature [27-29]. A particularly robust solution is 
found in [26], wherein an integrity algorithm that 
used Double-Differenced (DD) pseudorange, DD 
widelane (L1-L2) and the L1 carrier-phase in 
conjunction with an EKF is presented.  
Alternative approaches to detecting cycle-slips can be 
incorporated in integrity augmentation systems as 
described in [24,30-33]. Apart from GBAS and 
SBAS, integrity can be supported by systems on 
board the vehicle itself, referred to as ABAS, when 
implemented on an aircraft. An example of ABAS 
that processes variables including aircraft dynamics, 
antenna location and electromagnetic interference 
was implemented by Sabatini et al. [8], [34]  to raise 
timely visual and/or aural alerts to the pilot in the 
event of a threat to GNSS integrity. The system has 
been demonstrated to have synergies with other 
safety-critical applications such as Sense-and-Avoid 
(SAA) used in unmanned systems [35]. A similar 
integrity augmentation system does not exist for 
autonomous ground navigation that could detect 
potential sources of signal degradation and issue 
timely alerts (both cautions and warnings) to planning 
and control modules. This would enable autonomous 
ground vehicles to be predictive rather than reactive 
to GNSS data degradations. The traditional integrity 
augmentation systems described above are aimed at 
providing integrity for aerial platforms. On the other 
hand, the components of positioning error in GNSS-
based ground vehicle navigation are dominated by 
signal multipath from reflective objects close to the 
receiver antenna. The design of a ground vehicle 
integrity augmentation system is accordingly driven 
by an analysis of the GNSS signal errors unique to 
ground vehicle navigation. As previously mentioned, 
the ground vehicle integrity augmentation system 
presented in this paper adapts an ABIA system [8,34]  
to address GNSS integrity for ground vehicle 
navigation  in complex environments.  ABIA was 
originally intended to deliver integrity for aerial 
GNSS navigation by modelling the following GNSS 
error degradations:  
 Antenna masking: In aerial navigation, GNSS 
integrity is commonly threatened by lowered 
satellite visibility owing to obscuration or 
masking of the receiver antenna by the aircraft 
body during dynamic manoeuvres. ABIA 
addressed this error mode in [8] by triggering 
alerts to the pilot/autopilot  at threshold values of 
orientation angles (yaw, pitch, roll) to prevent 
reduced satellite visibility. But, in ground vehicle 
navigation, satellite visibility is dictated primarily 
by the presence of obstacles (buildings, trees, and 
other reflective surfaces) rather than vehicle 
manoeuvres.  
 Signal propagation losses and multipath-induced 
fading: In aerial navigation, the Signal-to-Noise 
Ratio (SNR) at the receiver front-end is a function 
of free-space loss, atmospheric attenuation and the 
transmitter and receiver antenna gains. Multipath 
is primarily attributed to signal reflection from 
aircraft fuselage and wings prior to arrival at the 
antenna. Ground vehicle multipath, in contrast, 
introduces greater randomness owing to the fact 
that signal reflection occurs at reflective surfaces 
close to the receiver antenna. Signal fading in 
these circumstances is dependent on the angle of 
incidence of the signal and the material properties 
of the reflector. 
 Multipath phase-error: Ground vehicle GNSS 
navigation is subject to error in signal code and 
carrier-phase measurement owing to signal 
multipath from reflectors located near the 
receiver, which ultimately biases the positioning 
solution. Therefore, the ABIA system cannot be 
directly applied to provide integrity for ground 
vehicle navigation.  The integrity augmentation 
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system presented in this paper extends the 
envelope of the ABIA system to ground vehicles 
through detailed modelling of ground multipath. 
Two categories of integrity alerts are defined as in 
[8]: caution flags and warning flags. The caution flag 
provides a model-predictive behaviour of the system, 
supporting the avoidance of signal 
degradations/losses. The prediction-avoidance 
capability of the integrity augmentation system is 
illustrated in Fig. 4. 
Caution 
Flag
TPredict TC-Report TAvoid
Impending 
Integrity Risk
Mission 
Management 
System
Initiate 
Avoidance
Integrity Risk 
Avoided
Integrity Risk
Critical 
Condition 
Predicted
Predict Avoid
Prediction-Avoidance
Signal 
Degradation 
Event
 
 
Fig. 4 Prediction-avoidance capability of the integrity augmentation system 
 
An integrity augmentation system for a ground 
vehicle navigating the airport environment (or any 
urban environment) would have to account for the 
unpredictability of masking and multipath in such 
scenarios. Lowering of system accuracy can happen 
in two ways as described in [8] in: misleading 
information from the system is not detected, or in the 
event that such a fault is detected, the user (remote 
operator) is not informed of it within an acceptable 
time limit, referred to as Time-To-Alert (TTA). TTA 
can be defined as the allowable time-window between 
an integrity risk being detected, and the user being 
alerted. The system predicts potential sources of 
signal degradation, which in the case of GNSS 
navigation would chiefly be multipath, antenna 
masking and signal propagation losses.  
The time required to predict a potential error source is 
denoted by ∆        . ∆           denotes the time 
required to report the potential problem to the mission 
planner. The reporting is accomplished by means of a 
caution flag that indicates an imminent malfunction. 
The mission planner would then initiate avoidance 
action to avoid a loss of positioning accuracy beyond 
a threshold that compromises navigation safety. This 
may involve actions like generating alternative 
trajectories[36], reducing weightage on GNSS 
measurements and giving precedence to alternative 
sensors such as INS or wheel speed sensors. The time 
taken to execute this is denoted by ∆      , and 
depends on the choice of preventive action. The 
reaction-correction capability of the integrity 
augmentation system is illustrated in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5 Reaction-correction capability of the integrity augmentation system 
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Fig. 6  Integrity augmentation system modules and data flow 
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The duration for which the caution and warning flags 
are raised to the autonomous mission planner is 
termed as Time-to-Caution (TTC) and Time-to-
Warning (TTW) respectively. The prediction-
avoidance model holds true when ∆           . If 
this condition is violated, system integrity would be 
compromised making it necessary for reactive-
correction to be initiated. Implementation of the 
alerting mechanism is achieved through a module that 
monitors the data provided by the GNSS receiver, 
termed as the Integrity Flag Generator (IFG). The 
IFG is illustrated in Fig. 6, along with its respective 
inputs and outputs.  
4. Sources of GNSS Accuracy Degradation 
This section models the sources of GNSS signal 
degradations and their effects on the estimated 
vehicle position. GNSS error sources are broadly 
divided into multipath induced effects and 
atmospheric errors classified according to the cause 
of the degradation as:  
 
 
 Multipath induced error 
- Multipath delay; 
- Multipath signal attenuation. 
 Atmospheric error 
- Ionospheric delay; 
- Tropospheric delay; 
- Tropospheric scintillation. 
The causes of GNSS signal degradation are shown in 
Fig. 7. The error in GNSS positioning is a function of 
pseudorange error and the geometry of the satellite 
constellation at the time of measuring the 
pseudorange and is given by [18]: 
                                     (1) 
where    is the Geometry Factor associated with the 
geometrical configuration of the satellite constellation 
at the time of measurement, and      is the User-
Equivalent Range Error, defined as the statistical 
aggregate of errors associated with each satellite. 
Neglecting clock biases, the components that 
comprise       are described in [18] and are briefly 
enumerated in the following section.  
REFLECTOR
DIRECT PATH SIGNAL θi
θi
RECEIVER ANTENNA
RECEIVER 
ANTENNA IMAGE
d d
IONOSPHERIC ERROR
TROPOSPHERIC ERROR
MULTIPATH DELAY 
AND ATTENUATION
 
Fig. 7 Causes of GNSS signal degradations. 
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4.1 Multipath induced error 
GNSS signal multipath induces error in the carrier-
phase measured at the receiver. Multipath phase error 
is a function of the phase shift of the multipath ray, 
which in turn is a function of the path length 
difference between the direct and multipath rays.   
The path length difference is purely dependent on the 
geometrical relationships between the satellite, 
reflecting surface and the receiver antenna. In order to 
verify if multipath exists for a given satellite, reflector 
and receiver configuration, and to compute the 
corresponding path-length difference, the receiver 
image technique[37] as  illustrated in Fig. 8 is applied 
as follows:  
 Compute the position of image of the receiver 
antenna in the reflector; 
 Compute the line vector from satellite to image; 
 Inspect whether the line vector intersects the 
reflector. If such an intersection exists, a 
multipath signal exists in addition to the 
direct-path signal, and the parameters that 
describe the multipath signal (delay and 
phase-shift) are computed. 
The ray-tracing method described herein assumes that 
the GNSS signal is a plane wave, an assumption that 
is valid owing to the large separation between the 
source (satellite) and the reflecting surface. A key 
advantage of the ray-tracing method over existing 
empirical models [38,39] of signal propagation in 
urban environments  is the ability to deterministically 
model local signal-terrain interactions in the vicinity 
of the receiver antenna. The adapted method  has 
been validated in [37,40] through comparison of 
simulated multipath error with errors in real GNSS 
signal measurement campaigns. Three experiments 
were conducted using known reflector geometry and 
material properties, and the multipath errors were 
isolated.  The experimental results closely matched 
the multipath error predicted using the ray-tracing 
model proposed in this study. The variation between 
the experimental and simulated multipath phase-error 
was in the range of     ≈ 3 mm, which was attributed 
to measurement noise. This level of noise is in 
agreement with the expected noise for most modern 
receivers [41]. Referring to Fig. 8, the algorithm to 
identify the existence of a multipath GNSS signal for 
a given satellite-reflector-receiver configuration is as 
follows:  
The location of the satellite (transmitter) is given as:  
                                       (2) 
The location of the GNSS receiver antenna is given 
as:  
                                      (3) 
 
U
V
W
R  
n
 
S
 
Fig. 8 Multipath ray tracing algorithm 
The coordinates of the vertices are known vectors 
denoted by  ,  ,  .   is the normal vector to the 
plane. The shortest line of approach from the receiver 
antenna   to the reflector is obtained. This line 
intersects the plane of the reflector at point  . The 
shortest line of approach is quantified by the 
parameter   given by:  
  
      
       
                             (4) 
The point   is computed as:  
                                   (5) 
1. Determine the coordinates of the receiver antenna 
image    , or the reflection of the receiver antenna 
about the reflector plane by : 
                               (6) 
2. Check whether the line from   to    intersects the 
reflector plane. If so, determine the coordinates of the 
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intersection point. Referring to Fig. 9, given a plane 
 , and a line segment  described by the parametric 
equation                  , where    and    
are the start and end-points of the segment (the end 
point is below the plane   in Fig. 9), the intersection 
point is at         , where the parameter value    
is calculated by: 
 
   
        
         
                          (7) 
 where   is  a point on the plane.  
3. After determining the intersection point    in Step 
2, determine whether the intersection point lies within 
the reflector. This is performed using an adaptation 
of [42] as illustrated in Fig. 9. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9 Intersection of a line and a triangular plane 
The intersection point    of line     with the plane   
of the triangle with vertices  ,   and  is expressed 
in parametric coordinates    and    given by: 
   
                   
                
                    (8) 
   
                    
                
                     (9) 
 
where       . The following conditions are 
verified to determine if    lies within the triangle:  
                                       (10) 
                                    (11) 
                                   (12) 
An intersection of     with the reflector indicates that 
a multipath signal exists for the given satellite-
reflector-receiver configuration. A single direct path 
signal and a single multipath signal arriving at the 
receiver antenna is modelled as in [18] and is 
characterized by amplitude, delay and phase 
parameters given by:  
        
   ̃           
 ̃  
   ̃         ̃                (13) 
where    and    are the amplitude and signal 
propagation time of the direct-path ray respectively. 
α1 and τ1 are the amplitude and signal propagation 
time of the multipath ray.  ̃  and  ̃  are the phase and 
excess delay of the multipath signal with respect to 
the direct path signal respectively.  ̃  is the 
Multipath-to-Direct ratio (MDR) of amplitudes 
      .      is the complex envelope of the 
transmitted signal. The oscillator in the receiver 
generates an identical reference signal given by 
         and the signal is correlated against the 
received composite (direct plus multipath) signal to 
track the received information. The correlation yields 
the below expression: 
 ̅       
    ̃               
 ̃  
   ̃          ̃            (14) 
The error in carrier-phase measurement due to the 
presence of the multipath signal is given as:  
       [
 ̃     ̃          ̃  
          ̃      ̃          ̃  
]       (15) 
The reader is directed to [18] for the derivation of 
equation 15.    is the error in carrier-phase induced 
by the multipath signal.   is the PRN code correlation 
function, which is dependent on the time delay   of 
the reflected (multipath) signal relative to the direct 
path signal and is given by:  
       
| |
 
        | |       (16) 
                                           | |               (17) 
where   is the PRN code bit (chip) period. If the 
excess multipath delay  ̃  is very small, then equation 
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15 reduces to:  
       [
 ̃     ̃ 
   ̃      ̃ 
]                (18) 
A similar model has been used to quantify multipath 
phase error in [37]. The phase shift  ̃  of the 
multipath ray (relative to the direct path ray) is 
directly proportional to the difference in path lengths 
between the direct path and multipath rays and is 
given by: 
 ̃  
     
 
                         (19) 
where    and    are the path lengths of the 
multipath-signal and the direct signal respectively. 
The attenuation  ̃ of the signal power after being 
reflected from a surface adversely impacts the signal 
tracking capability of the receiver, and  is a function 
of the following factors : The relative geometry 
between the receiver antenna and the reflector, 
permittivity and polarizing effect of the reflector, and 
gains of the satellite and receiver antennae. The 
relationship between the amplitudes, phases and 
polarization of transmitted and reflected waves is 
described by the Fresnel equations [43]. If an 
incoming right-hand circularly polarized signal 
(GNSS signal) is incident on an interface separating 
two media at an incidence angle   , the signal is 
partially transmitted through the interface, and 
partially reflected back into medium 1. This 
behaviour can be described in terms of the electric 
permittivity  , magnetic permeability  , refractive 
index,   of the two media. The power of the reflected 
signal is dependent on the Fresnel reflection 
coefficient    The Fresnel reflection coefficient can 
be resolved into perpendicular and parallel 
components as given by Kraus, Fleisch [44]: 
   
      √
  
  ⁄     
   
      √
  
  ⁄     
   
                      (20) 
   
  
  
  ⁄        √
  
  ⁄     
   
 
  
  ⁄        √
  
  ⁄     
   
         (21) 
where    and    are the perpendicular and parallel 
Fresnel  coefficients respectively. The subscripts 
indicate the medium. For a critical value of     known 
as the Brewster angle or polarizing angle, only 
perpendicular components will be produced after 
reflection. If the incidence angles are below this 
critical value, the total Fresnel reflection coefficient, 
  is given by: 
       
         
               (22) 
The fact that the direct path ray and multipath ray 
arrive at different angles of incidence at the antenna 
leads to different antenna gains for each signal, the 
effect of which can be quantified using the antenna 
gain ratio given by: 
   
  
  
                                (23) 
where     and    are the antenna gains of the direct 
and multipath signals respectively. Given equations 
22 and 23, and assuming a polarization factor F=1, 
the attenuation factor   of a multipath ray is 
computed as given in [37]: 
                                    (24) 
Given  , the multipath induced carrier-phase error in 
equation 18 is computed. This error translates to an 
error in receiver position estimation. 
 
4.2 Calculation of position error due to multipath 
The multipath phase error in Equation 18 biases the 
satellite-to-receiver antenna range estimate and its 
effect can be exacerbated by the relative geometry 
between the satellites and the receiver. The error in 
the position estimate of the GNSS solution    can be 
related to the error in the pseudorange measurements 
   as given in [18] by: 
                                  (25) 
The subsequent ranging error (between the satellite 
and receiver) is the product of the carrier-phase error 
  and wavelength of the signal   and is given by: 
                                   (26) 
   is a function of the satellite constellation geometry 
that amplifies the range-error to a position-error, 
given by:  
                                (27) 
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where   is the     matrix of the components of 
unit vectors pointing from the receiver location to the 
satellites (  = total number of satellites) given by: 
  [
          
    
          
]             (28) 
If the LOS unit vectors from the receiver antenna to 
the satellites are known, equation 26 can be used to 
compute the error in position due to the error in 
pseudorange. The geometry of the satellite 
constellation is quantified in practise by the DOP 
parameter [18]. The Horizontal Dilution Of Precision 
(HDOP) is used in this paper to quantify the effect of 
satellite geometry on the airport surface vehicle’s 
position error. 
4.3 Multipath induced SNR variations 
A single reflection model is presented to determine 
the lowered signal strength due to multipath. The 
SNR for a single multipath signal is a function of the 
direct (LOS) signal amplitude   , the multipath 
signal amplitude    and the relative phase shift,  ̃ 
[45] given by: 
 
  
   
    
    
           ̃        (29) 
where S is the signal strength,    represents noise in 
the signal due to multipath,    is the amplitude of the 
composite direct plus multipath signal. The phasor 
diagram for a single multipath and direct signal is 
shown in Fig. 10, which illustrates the concept of 
phase lock loop. The GNSS receiver measures in-
phase (I) and quadrature-phase (Q) components of the 
signal to estimate the carrier-phase   . The presence 
of the multipath ray introduces error   in the carrier-
phase measurement modelled as given in equation 18. 
Equation 29 is rewritten in terms of the MDR   as: 
 
  
  √                         (30) 
The measured SNR is therefore a scaled version of 
the amplitude direct signal. When there is no 
multipath, the parameter M is equal to 1, and SNR 
would be equal to the amplitude of the direct signal 
(neglecting all other sources of noise). 
 
I
Q
      
 
      
 ̃
 
Fig. 10 Phasor diagram for multipath analysis 
From [46], SNR is expressed as difference between 
the transmitted signal power and the noise power :  
                                      (31) 
From equations 28 and 29, the noise power due to 
multipath in dB is expressed as:  
                               (32) 
where 
  √                         (33) 
4.4 Atmospheric propagation errors and receiver 
noise 
Signal propagation through the atmosphere introduces 
errors in the satellite-to-user range estimation and 
causes signal attenuation, both of which can be 
modelled for each layer of the atmosphere. The 
presence of free electrons in the ionosphere affects  
the index of refraction of the medium through which 
the signal  is travelling [18] which, in turn, affects the 
wave propagation speed. It is noted in [47] and [25] 
that ionospheric delay can be broken up into two 
elements: the first is propagation delay wherein the 
PRN codes are delayed, and the carrier-phase is 
advanced. The second is delay due to refraction or 
bending of the signal, which can be omitted for 
satellites above an elevation of 15°. Path length 
differences due to the delays are modelled as: 
        
        
  
                    (34) 
        
       
  
                     (35) 
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where         is the signal path length difference 
due to the phase advance and         is the signal 
path length difference attributed to the PRN code 
delay.      is the Total Electron Count, which is a 
measure of electron density along the signal path 
length, and   is the frequency of the wave. The reader 
is directed to [18] for a more detailed description of 
ionospheric modelling. The delay in signal as it 
propagates through the troposphere is dependent on 
the refractive index of the medium, which in turn, is a 
function of the local temperature, pressure and 
relative humidity. Several models of tropospheric 
delay are in the literature[48,49]. Equation 36 models 
the delay as a function of satellite elevation angle     
[25] :  
                                  (36)  
where   is the satellite elevation angle and    is the 
refraction factor dependant on season and latitude. 
Signal attenuation occurs in the atmosphere and can 
be chiefly attributed to the presence of oxygen. The 
attenuation is modelled as [8]:  
     
    
          
                      (37) 
where   is tropospheric attenuation. This expression 
is relevant for elevation angles between 3˚ and 10˚. 
Another source of loss is tropospheric scintillation 
that varies the refractive index as a function of signal 
frequency and satellite elevation with respect to the 
receiver antenna [8] and is given by: 
                                   (38) 
where   is the signal frequency (Hz) and E is the 
elevation angle in radians. The tropospheric 
attenuation and scintillation in equations 37 and 38 
are combined into a single term     , which 
represents signal loss due to propagation through the 
atmosphere. The variations in signal power  during 
the propagation of the signal is commonly 
parameterized by the carrier-to-noise density ratio 
    ⁄   in dB-Hz adapted from [11]:  
   ⁄                     
                                 (39) 
where EIRP is the Equivalent Isotropic Radiated 
Power of the transmitted signal.     and      are the 
signal losses in free space and the atmosphere 
respectively.   and    are the receiver antenna 
thermal noise and the receiver front-end noise 
respectively.   is the multipath losses modelled 
previously.    and    are the satellite and receiver 
antenna gains respectively. Free space propagation 
loss is given by[50]:  
          (
   
 
)                  (40) 
where   is the Euclidean distance between the 
transmitter and receiver antennas and   is the 
wavelength of the transmitted signal. The thermal 
noise generated by the antenna is a function of 
antenna temperature given by:  
   10                          (41) 
where    represents the system bandwidth in Hz. 
The satellite antenna gain     and receiver antenna 
gain    are approximated by [8]: 
                               (42) 
 
                               (43) 
Equation 39 is used to quantify variations in signal 
strength owing to the errors introduced during signal 
propagation, which then forms the basis for setting 
threshold values or integrity thresholds for the 
integrity augmentation system. 
5. Integrity Flag Thresholds  
This section describes the procedure followed in 
determining integrity thresholds based on the GNSS 
signal degradation models presented in Section 4. 
Similar thresholds for antenna masking and 
propagation losses have been introduced [34]. Prior 
research on GNSS integrity augmentation for aerial 
navigation assigned thresholds for multipath detection 
based on the Early Late Phase (ELP) observable 
originally proposed in [51]. One of the key 
contributions of this research is the methodology 
followed in assigning the thresholds for the 
multipath-induced errors based on the multipath 
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models described earlier. 
5.1 Thresholds for multipath induced errors 
Given the locations of reflective surfaces in the 
environment that can potentially cause multipath,  
and the satellite constellation geometry, the Estimated 
Horizontal Error (EHE) of the receiver for each 
GNSS epoch is computed using the models described 
in Section 4 in an initial data gathering simulation. 
For all subsequent autonomous runs of the vehicle 
along the trajectory, values of EHE that exceed the 
integrity threshold  trigger alerts (caution and warning 
flags) to the mission management system to initiate 
avoidance measures.  Although GNSS multipath is a 
very actively researched topic, some alert limits have 
been proposed and introduced for aerial platform 
implementations [8,34,52,53] but standardised limits 
have not been prescribed for autonomous ground 
vehicles. Therefore, based on a trial-and-error 
approach (targeting an adequate predictive behaviour 
for the CIF in the intended airport environments), 
thresholds of 0.17 metres and 0.2 metres were 
selected for the CIF and WIF activation respectively. 
5.2 Antenna masking thresholds 
A minimum of four satellites must be visible to the 
receiver for computing the receiver position and clock 
bias. If antenna obscuration by environmental objects 
leads to a scenario with less than 5 satellites in view, a 
caution flag will be raised. A warning flag will be 
generated if this number of visible satellites reduces to 
below four satellites [54]. 
5.3 Thresholds for signal attenuation 
Two sources of signal strength attenuation exist. The 
first is propagation losses which include free space 
loss and atmospheric effects, and the second is 
multipath losses. The effect of these error sources is 
parameterized using the carrier to noise ratio described 
in Section 4. Given the power of the satellite 
transmitted signal, the minimum required signal level 
for the GNSS receiver [46], and the model of signal 
strength losses, a measured    ⁄  < -25 dB indicates 
signal strength below the minimum required signal 
power level. Caution flags are triggered at    ⁄  < 25 
dB-Hz and warning flags are triggered at    ⁄   24 
dB-Hz. The assigned thresholds are summarised in 
Table 1. 
 
Table. 1 Caution and warning thresholds for GNSS error sources 
Type of alert Integrity Event Thresholds 
Caution Flag 
Masking When number of visible satellites drops to below 5 
Multipath phase error When 0.17 m   EHE  0.2 m 
Signal attenuation When    ⁄  drops below 25 dB-Hz 
Warning Flag 
Masking When number of visible satellites drops to below 4 
Multipath phase error When EHE  0.2 m 
Signal attenuation When    ⁄  drops below 24 dB-Hz 
6. Airport Surface Vehicle Platform Model 
A four wheeled vehicle with four Degrees-of-
Freedom (4-DoF) is modelled as in [55,56] to 
describe the kinematics of the vehicle.  
 
The following assumptions are taken into 
consideration:  
 The airport surface vehicle tyres are always in 
contact with the ground. 
 Forces at the contact patches of the tyres can be 
resolved into components in the vehicles   -
plane. 
 The vehicle has a sufficiently low centre of 
gravity and hence any roll can be neglected. The 
  -plane is always parallel to the   -plane of the 
traversed surface. 
 The vehicle is front-wheel steered and the steering 
angle for both front wheels is the same. 
In order to simulate vehicle motion, the World 
Geodetic System (WGS-84) reference frame and the 
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vehicle body-fixed frame are introduced with axes 
      and        respectively. These coordinate 
frames are illustrated in Fig. 11. 
 
Fig. 11 Coordinate frames 
 
Both reference frames are right-handed cartesian 
reference frames. The body-fixed reference 
coordinate frame is defined with the following 
convention: The x-axis is directed along the 
longitudinal axis of the vehicle. The y-axis is normal 
to and directed outwards from the left side of the 
vehicle. The z-axis is directed upwards completing 
the right-hand coordinate system. Yaw ( ), Pitch ( ) 
and Roll ( ) are defined as rotations about the z-axis, 
y-axis and x-axis respectively. The stated 
assumptions allow the front and rear wheel pairs to be 
collapsed into a single front wheel and rear wheel. 
The front wheel has a lateral stiffness (sideslip 
coefficient) equivalent to twice the lateral stiffness of 
each individual front wheel and the same condition 
holds good for the rear wheel. The equations of 
motion for a vehicle of this type are given by [56], 
[57]:  
 ̇  
  
 
              (44) 
 ̇  
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The vehicle parameters are mass  , moment of 
inertia about the z-axis   , the distance between the 
centre of mass and the front and rear axles    and   . 
The lateral stiffness of the front and rear pairs of tyres 
are      and    . The states of the vehicle are the 
longitudinal velocity   , the lateral velocity    and 
the yaw rate  .    is the tractive force at the interface 
between the drive wheels and the road. The input to 
the vehicle model is the steering angle  . Equations 
44-46 are coupled with one another. If a constant 
longitudinal velocity    is assumed, equation 44 
becomes an algebraic expression, and is decoupled 
from equations 45 and 46, which are then written in 
state-space form as: 
[
 ̇ 
 ̇
]  [
 
       
   
            
   
 
           
    
 
   
       
    
    
] [
  
 
]  
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]              (47) 
Lateral velocity and yaw rate are extracted as outputs. 
Given the value of the constant longitudinal velocity, 
the path tracked by the vehicle in the world 
coordinate frame can be computed. The model tracks 
a given path by means of a path tracking non-linear 
feedback controller that adjusts the steering angle 
given in [4] :  
                        
      
    
      (48) 
where     is the orientation of the path segment 
closest to the vehicle,      is the yaw angle of the 
vehicle.   is the lateral distance between the vehicle 
and the path-segment closest to the vehicle at a given 
instant of time,   is the velocity of the vehicle and   
is a gain parameter that can be tuned. The first term 
on the right hand side of the equation represents the 
error between the orientation of the path and the yaw 
of the vehicle and orients the vehicle in a direction 
parallel to the path. The second term adjusts the 
steering non-linearly to minimise the lateral 
difference between vehicle and the path. 
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7. Simulation Case Studies 
Four simulation case studies were carried out to test 
the performance of the designed integrity 
augmentation system in various airport environments. 
Trajectories representative of airport surface 
operations were simulated in two airports including:  
 Trajectory (a): San Francisco International Airport 
(ICAO code: KSFO and IATA: SFO). 
 Trajectories (b), (c) and (d): Amsterdam Airport 
(ICAO code: EHAM and IATA: AMS). 
The airports were modelled in Trimble Sketchup
TM
 
environment. The simulated vehicle trajectories are 
representative of airside cargo trucks that shift 
luggage from a designated pick-up location to a drop-
off point next to the cargo bay of aircraft parked on 
the apron. Fig. 12 illustrates the airport apron 
adjacent to terminal two of San Francisco 
International Airport and Trajectory (a).  
 
 
Fig. 12  Simulated scenario at KSFO airport 
The measurements of the GNSS receiver mounted on 
the vehicle are affected by multipath caused by 
reflections from buildings and aircraft. The multipath 
introduces error in the carrier-phase measurement and 
attenuates the signal. The erroneous carrier-phase 
translates to an error in the computed position that is 
exacerbated by obstructions or masking of the 
receiver antenna. Additionally, the signal power is 
also attenuated by its propagation through the layers 
of the atmosphere. The purpose of the integrity 
augmentation system is to detect these sources of 
degradation and raise alerts to the mission 
management system in a timely manner. The 
following integrity augmentation modules of the 
system architecture are implemented in MATLAB
TM
:  
 Signal analysis module: Given the satellite 
elevation and line-of-sight vector between the 
receiver antenna and satellite, this module 
computes the carrier-to-noise ratio as modelled in 
section 4 and raises integrity alerts in the event of 
atmospheric attenuation; 
 Antenna masking module: This module detects 
blockage of the line-of-sight vector by objects in 
the environment given the object geometry and 
locations; 
 Multipath module:  This module provides phase 
error, range error and delay due to multipath using 
the ray tracing algorithm described in section 4. 
7.1 Satellite constellation 
A GPS constellation was simulated in MATLAB
TM
 
by using ephemeris data extracted from a YUMA 
almanac [58] that can be propagated to give satellite 
positions in the Earth-Centred Earth-Fixed (ECEF) 
coordinate system. This enables computation and 
tracking of LOS vectors between satellites and a 
given vehicle receiver.  
7.2 Satellite and receiver parameters 
The satellite and receiver parameters including EIRP, 
receiver antenna temperature and front end noise and 
bandwidth requirements are based on the link budget 
analysis presented in [46] and presented in Table 2. 
Table. 2 Satellite and receiver parameters 
Parameter Value 
EIRP 26.8 dbW 
Receiver antenna temperature 513 K 
Receiver front end noise 2 dB 
Carrier frequency 1575 MHz 
System bandwidth 2 MHz 
7.3 Vehicle dynamics model 
In order to generate a vehicle trajectory, the state-
space model of vehicle dynamics and the steering 
controller described earlier was modelled in 
MATLAB
TM
 and Simulink. The input to the vehicle 
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model is the steering angle and the output is the PVA 
in the local ENU frame.  
7.4 Navigation environment geometry 
The antenna masking and multipath modules require 
the geometry of the environment as inputs. The 
reflective surfaces in the navigation scenario are the 
facades of nearby buildings (airport terminals in this 
case). The simulation of GNSS signal multipath is 
restricted to first order reflections from nearby 
reflective surfaces. Ground echoes can be safely 
neglected since software defined receivers can be 
configured to reject signal rays arriving at a low 
elevation angle (usually <10°). This can also be 
achieved by   using choke ring antennas that can 
eliminate signals arriving from below the antenna 
phase centre.  
7.5 Meshing of airport environment 
The constructed airport geometry is converted to a 
STereoLithography (STL) file representing the airport 
environments as a set of Cartesian coordinates, which 
are then meshed into discrete triangular elements that 
are assumed to be infinitely thin, uniformly dielectric 
and non-magnetic. In order to represent the airport 
scenario comprehensively, aircraft CAD models were 
added to the environment to simulate aircraft on the 
apron. The procedure adopted can be summarised as 
follows:   
 Create a model of the navigation environment in 
3D modelling software.  
 Convert the CAD file to a STL file. This meshes 
the models into triangular elements. 
 Import the STL file into MATLABTM to extract 
triangle vertices coordinates. These coordinates 
are then used in the ray-tracing algorithm to 
simulate antenna masking and multipath. 
This three-step procedure is illustrated in Fig.13. 
Once the triangular mesh vertex coordinates are 
obtained and stored in the software compatible matrix 
form, the antenna masking and multipath influences 
on the GNSS data as the signal travels along a given 
path can be determined.  
 
Fig. 13 Navigation environment and geometry meshing 
7.6 Initial planning and data gathering  
The trajectory of the airport surface vehicle as it 
steers from the terminal to the aircraft and vice versa 
is depicted in Fig. 14. An initial data gathering and 
planning stage is performed to calculate multipath 
induced carrier-phase error, HDOP, amplitude 
attenuation, and the corresponding position-error for 
the planned trajectory.  
 
 
Fig. 14 Simulated trajectory at KSFO airport -
Trajectory (a) 
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Fig. 15 Surface-fitted model of position error against phase error and HDOP 
The integrity thresholds for the trajectory are set as in 
Table 1, and used for all subsequent autonomous runs 
along that trajectory. The relationship between carrier-
phase error, HDOP and position error was described 
by fitting a surface to the data gathered from the initial 
simulation. A linear interpolated surface was found to 
closely fit the data with a high value of the R-square 
coefficient (R-square = 0.9995) as shown in Fig. 15. 
The fitted surface was then used during subsequent 
autonomous runs to infer the EHE in real-time to 
compare against the assigned threshold. The algorithm 
implemented to generate masking and multipath flags 
is illustrated in Fig. 16. 
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Fig. 16 Algorithm for generating integrity alerts 
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7.7 Results 
The performance of the integrity augmentation 
system is presented for the four simulated trajectories. 
Generation of alert flags due to multipath phase-error 
is visualised in Fig. 17. Integrity alerts for antenna 
masking were raised for only a brief period of time 
during trajectory (a): Caution flags were raised in the 
interval between   = 0 sec ~   = 10 sec, and between 
  = 314 sec ~   = 324 sec. No warning flags were 
raised for antenna masking, implying that the number 
of visible satellites remained above 4 throughout the 
simulation. 
 
    
(i) 
 
 
(ii) 
 
(iii) 
                                                                             
 
                                         (iv) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Fig. 17 Caution and warning flags for multipath phase-error for (i) Trajectory (a), (ii) Trajectory (b),                                   
(iii) Trajectory (c) and (iv) Trajectory (d) 
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The results of the simulations show that the designed 
integrity monitoring system is capable of raising 
alerts predictively in the presence of multipath 
induced phase error, antenna masking and lowered 
signal strength. As expected, the number of flags 
raised was higher when the vehicle trajectory was 
closer to the buildings and aircraft. The time steps at 
which the flags are raised for the four simulated 
trajectories are presented in Table 3. 
The validity of the caution flags raised is analysed by 
determining True Caution Flags (TCF) as defined in 
[54].
 
Table. 3 Time steps at which alerts are raised for multipath phase errors 
Multipath Caution and Warning Integrity Flag Epochs 
San Francisco 
Airport - 
Trajectory (a) 
Caution 
Flag 
1~8,10~21,24~28,30~39,41~43,46,48~49,51,53,55,57,59~61,63~64,66~68,133~151 
Warning 
Flag 
7~8,12,15~17,25~31,34,134~141,143~144 
Amsterdam 
Airport - 
Trajectory (b) 
Caution 
Flag 
94,146~148,153~157,159~165,173~174,178~189,198~202 
Warning 
Flag 
198~202 
Amsterdam 
Airport - 
Trajectory (c) 
Caution 
Flag 
1,12,44~55,58~60,63~66,108~111,117,128 
Warning 
Flag 
45,47,49~50,52,54,59~60,64~66,110 
Amsterdam 
Airport - 
Trajectory (d) 
Caution 
Flag 
83~84, 87~88, , 97~102, 106, 113~117, 121~122, 129~137, 135, 142~145, 
Warning 
Flag 
116~117, 145 
If a caution flag is followed by a warning flag, 
this implies the integrity monitoring system has 
correctly predicted an imminent degradation in 
accuracy beyond the specified warning threshold 
and the caution flag is designated as a TCF. 
Metrics used to measure the system performance 
are the Detection Rate (DR)  given by warning 
flags preceded by caution flags, and the Caution 
Detection Rate (CDR) given by [54]:  
                 
   
       
                        (49) 
The number of TCF, false caution flags (caution flags 
not followed by warning flags) and warning flags, 
along with the computed DR for Trajectory (a) are 
shown in Table 4. 
Positioning error due to multipath affects GNSS 
data integrity in all three simulated trajectories, 
and is detected with an average DR of 1.0 and 
CDR of 0.45 when applying the integrity 
thresholds specified in Table 1. Fig 18 shows 
integrity alerts raised due to lowered signal 
strength due to a combination of propagation and 
multipath losses for SV2, which is at an average 
elevation of approximately 24° relative to the 
receiver antenna for the duration of the 
simulation. The time series of C/N0 ratio for 
Trajectory (a) for all satellites in the simulation 
are shown in Fig. 19, which represents the signal 
strength and noise levels due to free space loss, 
atmospheric loss, multipath and receiver noise. 
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Table. 4 Generation of integrity flags for trajectory (a) - performance analysis 
Multipath  
Phase Error 
Total number of Caution Flags 12 
Multipath DR = 1.0 
Multipath CDR = 0.41 
Number of True Caution Flags 5 
Number of Warning Flags  7 
Number of Warning flags preceded by 
Caution Flags 
7 
Masking 
Total number of Masking Caution Flags 1 
Masking DR = 1.0 
Masking CDR = 0 
Number of True Caution Flags 0 
Number of Warning Flags 0 
Number of Warning flags preceded by 
Caution Flags 
0 
Carrier-to-Noise 
Total number of signal loss Caution Flags 21 
Signal Loss DR = 1.0 
Signal Loss CDR = 0.47 
Number of True Caution Flags 10 
Number of Warning Flags 10 
Number of Warning flags preceded by 
Caution Flags 
10 
 
 
Fig. 18 Integrity alerts for signal attenuation in Trajectory (a) 
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Fig. 19 Carrier-to-noise ratio for all visible satellites - Trajectory (a)  
Masking and Signal loss were not major factors 
affecting GNSS data integrity in trajectories (b) 
and (c). This can be explained by the fact that 
visible satellite elevations in these trajectories are 
in the range of 40° - 45°.  
 
 
Subsequently, the high signal strength for these 
satellites renders them impervious to fluctuations 
caused by multipath. Antenna masking was found 
to be an integrity concern in Trajectory (d) as 
illustrated by the triggering of caution and 
warning flags in Fig. 20. 
 
 
Fig. 20 Caution and warning flags for antenna masking for trajectory  
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The minimum TTC recorded was 1 second, which 
represents the predictive capability of the system for 
the assigned alert thresholds. This performance was 
found to be worse  than the ABIA system developed 
for  aircraft flight operations [34], where a TTC of 
at least 2 seconds was achieved. However, it must 
be noted that the alerts in [34] were restricted to 
errors caused by aircraft manoeuvres and aircraft-
satellite relative geometry, which differ from the 
GNSS errors experienced by ground vehicles in 
dense airport  environments.  Additionally, ground 
vehicles are subject to fewer perturbations, making 
it feasible to predict trajectories with greater 
accuracy.  
For trajectories (a) and (c), it can be inferred that 
under the current thresholds, the system is overly 
sensitive to multipath induced errors in carrier-
phase measurement, and will lead to an excessive 
false-alarm rate when implemented on an 
autonomous system. Similar behavior was observed 
for the integrity flags raised for signal attenuation in 
Trajectory (a). Even though all warning flags were 
preceded by caution flags, a large number of false 
caution flags were raised. The favorable effect of 
high satellite elevation angle on signal strength can 
be inferred for satellites 3 to 8, all of which are at 
average elevation angles higher than 30°, and do not 
approach the assigned integrity thresholds for    ⁄  
in spite of being affected by multipath noise. On the 
other hand, satellites 1 and 2 are both at elevation 
angles of approximately 24°, making them 
susceptible to a loss of receiver tracking owing to 
the multipath induced variations in signal strength, 
which subsequently triggers integrity alerts. It is 
envisaged that if by further fine tuning the alert 
thresholds, the methodology presented in this paper 
can be used to design autonomous ground vehicle 
mission management systems that predict GNSS 
data losses and pre-emptively compensate for them 
for all surface vehicle operations. 
8. Conclusion  
The design and implementation of a differential 
carrier-phase GNSS based Navigation and 
Guidance System (NGS) for autonomous airport 
surface vehicle operations was presented. The 
system was designed to provide trusted autonomy in 
airport ground operations including cargo-handling, 
aircraft-towing, passenger transport, etc. The key 
focus was on modelling GNSS signal degradations 
affecting the overall system integrity. Based on the 
identified GNSS signal degradation mechanisms, an 
integrity monitoring and augmentation system was 
introduced to produce timely alert flags based on 
both model-predictive and reactive (observation-
based) features. Multipath was found to be the 
dominating source of integrity degradation owing to 
its dependence on the complex nature of the airport 
navigation environment. A ray tracing algorithm 
was adopted to detect multipath and compute its 
associated parameters, namely multipath delay, 
amplitude attenuation and phase error, which served 
as metrics to indicate integrity degradation. The 
airport vehicle platform and steering controller was 
modelled and realistic trajectories were generated to 
test the integrity augmentation system and its 
assigned thresholds through simulation. A model of 
positioning error as a function of multipath 
parameters and the satellite geometry (unique to the 
given trajectory and navigation environment) was 
generated prior to the autonomous run. During the 
autonomous run, integrity alerts were generated in 
real-time, from which the following conclusions are 
deduced: 
 The presented integrity augmentation system is 
capable of early detection of GNSS accuracy 
and signal degradations due to multipath, 
masking and attenuation. 
 
 The model was also tested for various other 
trajectories to determine whether accuracy 
degradation could be detected as in the initial 
tested trajectory. A similar detection of GNSS 
errors leads to the inference that a single model 
of positioning error for one trajectory and 
navigation environment, can be used to provide 
integrity alerts during autonomous runs for all 
classes of airport ground vehicles.  
The multipath model in this study was deterministic 
in nature and confined to single-order reflections as 
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a starting point of research. Future research is aimed 
at extending this concept to multiple reflections and 
validating the described methodology through 
conducting real-time experiments. The feasibility of 
using the presented algorithm to facilitate guidance 
and trajectory optimization in the presence of GNSS 
error sources will be explored as a future topic for 
individual vehicles and fleets.  
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